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Introduction 
Substantial extension of the human lifespan has recently become a subject oflively 
debate. One reason for this is the completion in 2001 of the Human Genome 
Project and the experimental avenues for biogerontological research it has opened. 
Another is recent theoretical progress in biogerontology. In the 1990s more and 
more biogerontologists began to agree on the evolutionary cause ofsenescence: it 
results from a trade-offbetween the investment ofresources in reproduction on the 
one hand and in maintenance and repair of the body on the other.This represents 
a powerful simplification of the theoretical underpinnings of biogerontological 
research, necessary to make anti-ageing technology a plausible idea (Hayflick, 
1994; Holliday, 1995,2006; Austad, 1997; Kirkwood, 2005). 
But the character of modern culture is at least as important an explanation of 
the current debate on life-extension intervention.Three existential factors playing 
a role here are fear of death (fear of no longer existing), fear of the suffering 
involved in the process of dying, and the sometimes obsessive desire to preserve 
good health in order to pursue life projects and goals (Turner, 2004) .The historical 
background of this motivational pattern is 
... the decline since the Renaissance offaith in supernatural salvation 
from death; concern with the worth of individual identity and 
experience shifted from an otherworldly realm to the 'here and now', 
with intensification ofearthly expectations. (Gruman, quoted in Post, 
2004a: 82) 
A specific occasion for strong interest in 'anti-ageing medicine' is the ageism 
many people seem to encounter in conventional medicine: 
Anti-aging practitioners largely rebel against the age norms accepted 
by more mainstream medicine. In other words, for these practitioners, 
there is no 'normal' that should be accepted for a man of 72 years 
177 
~Valuing older people 
when, instead, we can tCllXCt his care toward the 'norms' of a 30 year 
old man. (Mykytyn, 200(): 282, emphasis in original) 
Interest in substantial life extension is large, therefore, and in a volume on ageing 
and values such a project might easily be assumed to be worthy of support: if 
later life is good, more of it would be better. 
But would this really be a good thing? Experience with other revolutionary 
technologies is that, once they exist, they can no longer be stopped. Too much 
has been invested in them: once research has produced an effective technology 
catering to all-too-human desires, there is seldom a return path. We had better 
investigate the ethical aspects of considerable human lifespan extension now, 
before this extension has become genuinely practicable, or before large sums of 
money have been spent on it. We shall see, first, that these apparently technical, 
biomedical questions cannot be discussed without considering ethics and values, 
and, second, that this investigation inevitably dem.ands that we try to conceptualise 
something of what ageing itself and being human is about. 
Substantial extension of human lifespan: what are we talking 
about? 
Before embarking on an ethical discussion it has to be clear what we mean by 
'substantial extension ofhuman lifespan' .We can distinguish between four possible 
outcomes of a biotechnological enhancement of the human lifespan.Varying on 
work by Harry Moody (1995), Eric Juengst and others Ouengst et aI, 2003: 24­
8), we can term these extended morbidity, compressed morbidity, decelerated 
senescence and arrested senescence. 
Extended morbidity means that the average human life becomes longer because the 
period of(co)morbidity at the end is lengthenedThrough good hygiene, nutrition, 
education, housing, medical care, welfare arrangements and social services, older 
people with one or more chronic diseases stay alive 10nger.This means that average 
life expectancy increases, but this need not be an increase in human flourishing 
and cause for joy. Extended or prolonged morbidity does not entail an increase in 
maximum human life expectancy. A typical time structure for a human life with 
extended morbidity could be: growing up from 0 to 20, adult health span 20 to 
55, period of growing morbidity up to 95 as the average age at death and with 
an unchanged maximum of around 120. Extended morbidity is a scenario some 
scientists (Baltes, 2003: 17) fear as the most likely one, with Alzheimer's disease as 
one of the main threats. 1 Since nobody wishes it to become reality, we shall not 
discuss the ethical desirability of this type oflife extension here. 
Compressed morbidity is a scenario in which the onset of serious age-associated 
maladies is delayed as long as possible and thus these are compressed into a shorter 
period. The max:imum human lifespan of around 120 is accepted as fixed. The 
focus of compressed morbidity is that the average human health span is extended 
to a much longer period from 20 up to 'the ideal average life span, approximately 
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85 years' (Fries, 1980: 130) followed by a relatively short period of decline before 
death, a period of one or two years at the most. 
The feasibility of compressing morbidity for the life stage between 55 and 85 
was first argued for by James Fries in 1980 and it has been embraced by many 
- for example, the biogerontologist Robert fu'king (2004: 179). Not long ago 
three officials of the World Health Organization (WHO) wrote that Fries's tenets 
and vision 'now lie at the heart of today's approach to NCDs [nonconU1ll1nicable 
diseases], ageing and health with its focus on the life course, health promotion, and 
"active ageing" [use it or lose it]' (Kalache et al, 2002: 243). Because its original 
assumption is that the maximum human lifespan is b.iologically predeternuned 
at around 120 and that death at an average age of 85 is 'natural' and even 'ideal', 
compression of morbidity is not a form of substantial life extension. It must be 
noted, however, that many gerontologists hold that compression of morbidity is 
actually impossible.They think it highly unlikely that we will be able to increase 
health span without simultaneously increasing lifespan and the period ofmorbidity 
at the end.2 Compression ofmorbidity then turns out to be practically the same 
as delayed or decelerated senescence. 
Decelerated senescence is an outcome in which processes of biological ageing are 
slowed, resulting in higher average life expectancy and probably higher maximum 
life expectancy. Decelerated senescence means that the period of good health in 
a human life is extended (as in the scenario of compressed morbidity), but the 
period of morbidity remains the same or is lengthened as well (as in extended 
morbidity). The average pattern of a human life in tlus case could be: growing 
up 0-20, adult health span 20-90 and period of decline after that with death at 
an age of 112. Maximum life expectancy at birth nlight be 140 years. 
Richard Miller is a respected biogerontologist who considers that such a retarded 
or decelerated senescence is the most likely development: 
Nature can slovv down aging, and so, it turns out, can we. There are 
so far two approaches that work for sure: diminished total caloric 
intake and changes in genes that regulate the rate ofearly-life growth. 
(Miller, 2004: 233) 
A recent and clear manifestation of the idea of decelerated senescence can be 
found in an article by Jay Olshansky and others, including Miller (Olshansky et 
aI, 2006).They can be regarded as representatives ofa growing chorus ofscientists 
ternling themselves 'moderate', 'modest' and 'realistic'. They firmly believe that 
an investment now of three billion US dollars annually will make it possible to 
decelerate ageing and the onset of ageing-related diseases and disorders among 
the baby boom cohorts by seven years: 
People who reach the age of 50 in the future would have the health 
profile and disease risk of today's 43-year-old; those aged 60 would 
resemble current 53-year-olds, and so on. Equally important, once 
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achieved, this seven-year delay would yield equal health and longevity 
benefits for all subsequent generations, much the same way children 
born in most nations today benefit from the discovery and development 
of inuTIunizations. (Olshansky et aI, 2006: 32) 
Arrested smescence refers to relatively complete control of the biological processes 
of senescence. In this scenario, ageing in the sense of senescence or physical and 
mental deterioration does not occur any more, or the human organism is cared 
for very well (maintenance) and what senescence occurs is periodically repaired by 
a rejuvenation cure. For decades or centuries the chance to die does not increase 
with age any more, but stays rather constant. People still die, but they no longer 
die from the slow accumulation of damage and chronic deterioration. Instead 
they die from accident, murder or war. In this scenario people can become very 
old. Average life expectancies of 150,500 or even 5,000 years are thought to be 
possible. 
Discussing the engineering ofarrested senescence may evoke images ofquackery, 
pseudoscience or science fiction. But a number of important organisations that 
promote anti-ageing and eventually arrested senescence exist: the American 
Academy ofAnti-Aging Medicine (A4M) , the Gerontology Research Group, the 
Longevity Meme, the Inunortality Institute, the Maximum Life Foundation, the 
Life Extension Foundation and the World Transhumal1.ist Association. Influential 
individuals promoting arrested senescence include Deepak Chopra, Ronald Klatz, 
Michael Brickey,]ean Carper, Gary Null,Walter Pierpaoli,johannes Huber,joao 
Pedro de Magalhaes, Max More, Nick Bostrom,]ames Hughes, Robert A. Freitas, 
] r and Ray Kurzweil. 
One of the strongest defenders of the scientific credibility of Strategies for 
Engineering Negligible Senescence (SENS) is the English biogerontologist 
Aubrey de Grey. He not only vehemently argues that humanity needs to set aside 
massive sums of money for a war on ageing, he also has embarked, together with 
relevant specialists, on detailing biotechnological measures we could use to beat 
the 'seven deadly things'3 that accumulate with age as side-effects ofmetabolism 
(de Grey et aI, 2002; de Grey, 2003, 2005). He expects that, between 2025 and 
2040, we will be able to fix these problems (to a large extent through genetic 
interventions and stem cell therapies) and that, around 2050, 'robust human 
rejuvenation' will be generally accessible. He realises that the first fixes will be 
imperfect, but they will give us time to develop better repair methods. According 
to de Grey, cancer is the hardest problem to solve, but he thinks it possible. Highly 
respected biogerontologists have attacked de Grey's ideas forcefully (Warner et 
aI, 2005; Estep et al, 2006). It is important to note, however, that differences of 
opinion are mainly political, ethical and related to funding and estimates about 
the speed of future developments, and not about the possibility of substantial 
life-extension in itself. 
We should note that the (US) President's Council on Bioethics has taken 'the 
possibility of extended youth and substantially prolonged lives' very seriously. In 
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its 2003 report Beyond therapy (President's Council on Bioethics, 2003: 159--2(4) 
the Council warns agail1st substantial life extension as a threat to the meaning of 
human lives. 
Life extension and ethics 
To offer some insight into the ethical aspect of life extension, I shall try to 
sunmlarise the major ethical arguments for and against effective substantial 
extension of human lifespan, though intricate exarnination of each will not be 
possible. By substantial extension I mean decelerated senescence and arrested 
senescence as outlined above. Decelerated senescence is much more probable as 
the scenario for decades to come, but arrested senescence is certainly interesting 
and cannot be completely ruled out for the long run. From an ethical point of 
view, arrested senescence is significant. It forces us to think in new ways about 
what we consider most important in our lives and societies. This is significant 
even if arrested senescence itself turns out to be impossible. 
Interpreting and adding to the framework by Stephen Post (2004b), I have 
organised the arguments in the following categories: autonomy, beneficence 
(including non-maleficence), distributive justice and meaning oflife. 
Autonomy 
It is true that the principle or value of autonomy does not figure prorninently in 
the ethical debate about life extension. Moreover, it is possible to regard autonomy 
or freedom not as an overriding principle but as one of the good things we value 
- discussing it under the category of beneficence. However, various kinds of 
consent and refusal are crucial in traditional biomedical ethics (Beauchamp and 
Childress, 2001), so it would seem anomalous not to approach it explicitly; besides, 
'autonomy' is often referred to as a fundamental value in liberal democracies. 
First of all, substantial extension of lifespan in the sense of decelerated or 
arrested ageing at this moment is (still) very much a collective matter. Decisions 
to try to extend human life substantially remain for the time being political or 
corporate decisions, for instance about priorities in medical research.Thus, taking 
autonomy seriously comes down to taking liberal democracy and citizenship 
seriously. Of course, there is debate about the best way to shape democracy in a 
highly multicultural, globalised and technological era (Benhabib, 1996; Habermas, 
1998; Carens, 2000; Korten, 2000; Marres, 2005). The democracy debate is not 
uniquely concerned with matters oflifespan extension, but is highly relevant for 
how political decisions on life extension can best be made. How will it be possible, 
for example, to prevent social wrongs and injustice and at the same time respect 
individual reproductive liberty?Will future wealthy parents have the right to give 
their children genetically engineered substantially extended life expectancies that 
will be inheritable? Should the state be allowed to intervene in reproductive 
decisions in order to prevent injustice (Holm,2004)? 
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Decisions about priorities in medical and biotechnological research will have 
impacts on future generations. Inevitably we must act paternalistically towards 
future generations; we cannot consult them.We can only try to judge imaginatively 
what will be good for them and not harm their interests. In some cases we can 
take precautionary measures, making it easier for people conung after us to reverse 
our decisions. This implies that we should be cautious with lifespan extension 
involving germline, hereditary genetic engineering. We must be conscientious 
in our judgernents about what is good for future people. Perhaps engineering 
substantial life extension gives people a real choice they lack now; perhaps this 
is no problem at all, because people with extended lifespans could always decide 
for themselves and opt for suicide (Horrobin, 2005: 19). But would it not be 
problematic to create a society in which more and more people required this 
extraordinary exit strategy? 
Beneficence 
Ifsociety opts to allow itselfand inclividuals the opportunity to make autonomous 
decisions about life extension, why should they choose or not choose m.uch longer 
lives? An important aspect of the answer concerns the positive or negative effects 
that may reasonably be expected of the decision. Beneficence concerns the moral 
duty to contribute to the experience of things human beings value, including the 
duty to prevent harm - that is, the experience of things we value negatively. Now, 
what this means depends on what we ultimately value positively and negatively. 
Ultimate positive values that are often mentioned are preservation of (the quality 
of) life; enjoyment, pleasure, happiness, fulfrlment or welfare; human company, 
fioiendship or cornmunity; self-respect and being respected by others; achievement 
despite obstacles; self-realisation or authenticity; creation and contemplation 
of beautiful things; knowledge; freedom, autonomy, independence or power; a 
healthy mind in a healthy body. Things that are valued negatively are the lack or 
loss of these things and pain and suffering. 
The preservation and continuation of life is often mentioned frrst, but on 
closer inspection it is not life itselfwe ultimately want, but a certain quality oflife 
characterised by a healthy body and an active ntind endowed with memory and 
not overcome with pain (Brandt, 1959: 342; see also Horrobin, 2006). Christine 
Overall holds that the main argul11.ent in favour oflife extension is not that life in 
itselfis valuable, but 'that a longer life is the prerequisite for almost everything else 
that one ntight want' (Overall, 2004: 287). Because of the nuny possible things 
people nught judge to be ultimate values, and because in a democracy we want to 
let people decide for themselves about this as much as possible, Overall's argument 
looks strong, because it is so general. But much longer life comes at a cost. Jeanne 
Calment, who died when she was 122, stood at the graves of her husband, all 
her friends, her only daughter and even the grave of her only grandchild (Baars, 
2006: 199).The vulnerability of human beings is not simply physical. It also has a 
crucial social dimension. Living very long might be attractive only if the people 
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around you also live as long. Moreover, life extension also comes at a cost literally. 
Money spent on research into fundamental processes ofbiological ageing cannot 
be spent on asthma research or on education or art subsidies. And a society with 
a growing number of older and really old people will need much reorganisation. 
Costs and benefits (negative and positive effects) oflife extension and longevity 
must be weighed against each other. Because it is not life in itself that we want, 
there might be things that are more important than longer life. 
The quasi-neutral aspect of longevity - everybody can decide for themselves 
what to do with a longer life - makes it fit nicely into a liberal democracy and 
an individualistic society. But longer bves can also cause problems for what we 
think valuable. During the last decade we have seen many discussions about the 
'greying' of society and the problems this will cause. This chapter can only deal 
with examples chosen to illustrate the nature and variety of problems involved. 
The danger of an overpopulated world and the problems it entails has often 
been offered as an objection to substantial life extension. Population growth 
or reduction is not just the result of the death rate; the birth rate is at least as 
important a factor (Dykstra, 2002: 8). In general, birth rates tend to fall as life 
expectancy increases. Reproductive decision making governing fertility and 
parental investment might be driven by a human psychology designed by natural 
selection to maximise material wealth, not just the largest number of surviving 
and reproducing children (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998; see also Hrdy, 1999). Many 
other, highly unpredictable factors are in play. To mention just one: 
. .. human vulnerability [might increase] due to new infectious diseases 
or antibiotic resistant strains ofbacteria ... Disease may well continue 
to be an effective leveller, improving its technology as we improve 
ours. (Harris, 2003: 75) 
However, if substantial life extension is achieved and the death rate drops 
dramatically, would the decline in birth rate keep pace? Or would governments 
have to resort to drastic measures, prohibiting either life extension or children? 
It seems at first a decisive argument when de Grey or de Magalhaes writes that 
it is morally unacceptable to let old people die in order to solve problems of 
an overpopulated world. However, is it really obvious that extending the lives 
of people who already exist is always better than opting for children? Even 
recognising the fact that people who do not yet exist cannot suffer, a society with 
children might still be better than one without, for people who do exist. 
Another social problem is presented as a beneficence argument in favour of 
accepting substantial life extension. Stephen Post argues from his expert knowledge 
ofAJzheimer's and the pain, suffering and lack of community, self-respect and 
independence that go with this disease. He writes: 
The stark reality of our already aging societies is that ... [m]any will 
experience chronic illness for which old age is the dominant risk factor, 
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ranging from Alzheimer's and Parkinson's to osteoporosis and vascular 
disease ... The solution to this problematic ofage-related disease may 
rest with advances in the basic science ofaging that would achieve even 
greater prolongevity in a manner that avoids the massive debilitation 
that currently plagues us. (Post, 2004b: 537) 
Because we might be able to prevent the strong negative value of age-related 
chronic diseases by anti-ageing interventions, must we develop these? They will 
deliver extended life expectancy, but according to Post this is a necessary price 
to pay for success in the fight against horrible suffering (if it is a price). Rudi 
Westendorp, a Dutch biomedical gerontologist, takes a similar view, but warns 
that effective therapies for the age-related diseases we know now will extend 
average life expectancy and this will unmask new diseases related to newly 
possible longer lives. Therapies will be needed for diseases we now know little 
about (Kohler, 2004) - and so on. Post's argument turns out to be not so self­
evidently in favour of anti-ageing interventions. His solution is not definitive; 
hard choices will be needed. 
Although new technological possibilities, expensive drugs and new conditions 
such as obesity will also be very important factors contributing to an expected rise 
in medical expenditure, 'an increase in life-expectancy that is not accompanied by 
a proportionate increase in healthy years will lead to a great increase in healthcare 
costs' (Knook, 2002: 21). In most industrialised countries the percentage ofhealth­
care resources4 spent on those over 65 is already much greater than the percentage 
spent on the entire remaining population (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001: 
260). Estimates are that by 2050 the US will spend more than 3 thousand billion 
dollars annually only on Alzheimer's disease and related dementias (Olshansky 
et aI, 2006: 31). Shall we be able to pay for an expanded scenario along these 
lines? Would such costs cripple all other social and personal priorities? Besides, 
because wealthy people live longer, schemes like the American Medicare program 
(309 billion dollars in 2006) might be thought to contain an ethically dubious 
element. To a significant extent they are equivalent to channelling tax revenue 
from the population at large towards expensive care for the fairly well-off (van 
Wijnbergen, 2002: 37). And, as the ageing populations of developed countries 
require more medical attention, devouring doctors and nurses from developing 
countries, shortages ofhealth-care workers in the developing world would create 
ever more desperate situations (Garrett, 2007: 15,26). 
Distributive justice 
Ethics is not only about promoting the good and preventing the bad things in 
life and the real possibility of shaping it yourself, it is also about the distribution 
of all this. Justice is about the distribution of the (lack of) things we value (such 
as freedom, happiness, friendship, beautiful things and good health) and the things 
we do not want (a life solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short). At the beginning 
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ofthis chapter I distinguished between all kinds oflife expectancies, but I omitted 
one very important factor: the 'social gradient' of longevity. Life expectancies 
differ according to social status. Michael Marmot's recent sununary starts with 
an illustration from the US capital: 
If you take the Metro from the southeast of downtown Washington 
to Montgomery County, Maryland, in the suburbs - a distance of 
about 14 miles - for each mile traveled life expectancy rises about a 
year and a half. This is the most life-enhancing journey in the world. 
There's a twenty-year gap between poor blacks at one end of the 
journey (male life expectancy fifty-seven), and rich whites at the 
other. (Marmot, 2005: 5) 
Such inequalities in life expectancy at birth are enormous and they are universal. 
They exist all over the world (Mackenbach and Bakker, 2003; Marmot, 2004: 
13-36). What counts as injustice depends on the theory of justice that is used. 
However, whether one refers to human rights (Buitenweg, 2007),5 Rawls's 
theory ofjustice as fairness (Rawls, 1999a, 1999b), Dworkin's (2000) equality of 
welfare and resources or Nussbaum's (2001,2006) capabilities theory, differences 
in average life expectancy at birth of 40 years between countries Oapan and 
Zimbabwe), and more than 20 years for socioeconomic groups within countries 
- differences that can be removed and prevented by collective social action - are 
hard to defend as morally acceptable. 
Now im.agine what would happen if in such a world substantial life extension 
became possible through initially very expensive biotechnology like longevity 
pharmaceuticals or gene therapy. The demand backed by purchasing power, 
certainly in the beginning, would come mainly from young adult';, better educated, 
wealthier and higher-income individuals and those with higher initial endowments 
of health. Socioeconomic and health inequalities would be amplified. A S11ull 
group of people with an already high life expectancy would have access to life 
and health span extension; many less-privileged people would not. Surely this 
is undesirable? 'The need-based claims of the worse off to have reasonably long 
lives have more moral weight than the preference-based claims of the better off 
to have longer lives' (Glannon, 2001: 167; see also McConnel and Turner, 2005: 
61; Mauron, 2005). 
But the existence of social injustice can never normally be a valid reason to 
object morally to any improvement in the fate of human beings who do not 
belong to the most underprivileged ones. As Stephen Post writes: 
If we were to insist that technological developments of all sorts wait 
until the world becomes perfectly just, there would be absolutely 
no scientific progress. Requiring equality as the prerequisite to 
biogerontological advance is to establish an obstacle that is virtually 
insurmountable, and so exceedingly high as to be implausible. Indeed 
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this is not a requirement imposed in any other area ofscientific research 
and development, from new dental treatments to organ transplantation 
... Anti-aging research and, eventually, derived treatments, will emerge 
in technologically advanced countries and be affordable to those who 
can pay.This is the unavoidable future ofall biotechnological efforts in 
human enhancement. And yet scientific creativity of this sort will not 
be inhibited. (Post, 2004b: 537; see also Harris 2003; Davis 2004) 
Post is right in many ways. Demanding equality and perfect justice within 
and between countries as a prerequisite to the development of life extension 
technology is asking too much. Here, as often, 'perfection' would be the enemy of 
the good. On the other hand, not being able to do everything or enough, should 
be no excuse for doing nothing. Efforts like the UN Millennium Development 
Goals6 are very significant. It is important before 2015 to try to reduce by half 
the proportion ofpeople living on less than a dollar a day, to reduce by two thirds 
the mortality rate among children under 5 and to try to reduce by three quarters 
the maternal mortality ratio (Garrett, 2007: 32).These are challenging goals but 
they are technically feasible and depend mainly on political will. In the same vein 
ambitious but feasible goals could be formulated to attack the shocking disparities 
in longevity between and also within countries. Within countries, Christine 
Overall proposes a qualified prolongevitism that will genuinely be for all, a kind 
of affirmative action in the field oflife extension: 
... as a general principle, support for increased longevity should not 
be limited by gender, socioeconomic class, sexual orientation, race, or 
ability. So the particular focus, at least in the short run, ofmeasures to 
increase average life expectancy must be on members of groups that 
historically have been disadvantaged and that currently have low life 
expectancy. (Overall, 2003: 200) 
This implies that increased research into conditions and diseases affecting groups 
of people with low life expectancy, like people of colour and poor people, is 
morally indicated.This kind of priority setting, including maintaining the global 
priority for compression ofmorbidity between 60 and 80, might provoke strong 
political opposition, but that is no reason to be silent about a considered ethical 
judgement. 
Furthermore, it is important to see that priorities do not have to be 'all or 
nothing'. Serious, strenuous attempts to tackle the national and global social 
gradient oflongevity certainly do not require a complete halt for biogerontological 
research into the diseases of the oldest older people and general underlying 
processes of senescence. In relation to international injustice, one should not 
forget that numbers of the old and oldest older people in developing countries 
will also increase rapidly. Already the remaining life expectancy ofa woman who 
has managed to reach the age of 60 in Brazil (21 more years), India (18 years) 
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and Nigeria (17 years) is not so different from the number of years an average 
60-year-old female inhabitant of the US can expect to add to her life (24 years). 
TheWHO anticipates that the percentage ofpeople above 60 living in developing 
countries between now and 2050 will rise from 60 to 85% of the total global 
number (Kalache et aI, 2005: 36; see also Kirkvvood, 1999: 8; Aboderin, 2006). 
In China and India older people will outnumber the total current population of 
the US by mid-century (Olshansky et ai, 2006: 31). 
Meanings of life 7 
So far we have seen that autonomy, beneficence and justice evoke important 
considerations in connection with life extension. Our task seems to be to weigh 
pros and cons in a situation of risk and uncertainty about the future. However, 
some important authors attempt a more definitive position, not wishing to wait 
and see. They take a principled stand against life extension now. HansJonas,Leon 
Kass, Francis Fukuyama, Daniel Callahan and Bill McKibben represent what one 
might call a natural-law position. Not only is this a significant stance in itselt~ its 
discussion points very clearly to the way in which issues of meal1il1g recur in the 
discussion of life extension. 
Important aspects of the natural-law position are: that ageing is the final stage 
in a natural life cycle that should be cultivated (Callahan, 1995a, 1995b; see also 
Overall, 2003, 2004), that ageing is a natural process to be accepted and not a 
disease to be defeated (Callahan, 1995a, 1995b; see also Izaks and Westendorp, 
2003; Caplan, 2004, 2005; Moody et ai, 2004; Scully, 2004; Derkx, 2006), that 
the goals ofmedicine and health care include therapy (treatment) and prevention 
but not enhancement (see also Juengst, 1997,1998,2004; Brock, 1998; Frankford, 
1998), and that it is unnatural and selfish to prefer a society with many very old 
people and very few children over a society with fewer older people and a more 
natural succession of 'fresh' generations (McKibben in Stock et aI, 2003; Kass, 
2004: 317-18). 
It seems simple to dismiss natural-law positions as an untenable deontological 
stance by observing that if substantial life extension starts to occur in nature it 
begins to be 'natural', or emphasising that humans have always changed nature 
(including their own natural features) in the course ofcivilization. Much the same 
goes for the religious versions of these arguments, referring to a God who has 
established the natural law. That humans should respect the will of God or that 
they should not attempt to play God encounters similar intellectual difficulties 
as the exhortation to respect nature, and additional difficulties too. Referring to 
the will of God is not a very strong argument in a pluralistic democratic society 
that includes atheists and agnostics. 
However, it is possible to discover something important behind these arguments 
from nature or God, even if one rejects their absolute verbal form and is more 
inclined towards consequentialist ethics. Human nature is not blank, nor completely 
and always easily malleable. It results from millions ofyears ofnatural selection. As 
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evolutionary products human beings are very complex organisms involving many 
trade-offs, referring back to environments in the past.We cannot design humans 
from scratch. Stressing that we ought to be wary ofbad unintended consequences 
is not to claim that nothing should be changed. It is possible for a society to opt 
for a policy of less than one child per family to counteract undesirable effects 
of population growth due to increasing old-age survival, but will its individuJI 
citizens accept this policy and live up to it? HUInan nature is very flexible, but it 
is possible to ask too much of human beings. It seems relevant, for example, to 
speculate about the emotional implications of a population scenario with nine 
billion peopl in 2300 with an average life expectancy at birth ofabout 100 years 
and a high proportion of very old people (Basu, 2004: 93). And we should be 
talking here not only about what is possible for human beings, individually and as a 
group, but also about what is good for them and what makes their lives meaningful. 
To ask what desires and emotions are humanly 'natural' can be translated into a 
question about what desires and emotions are good and proper for human beings 
to have and that deserve the opportunity to be acted upon. 
Authors criticising substantial life extension often point to loss of meaning. 
Thus, Hans Jonas writes: 'Perhaps a non-negotiable limit to our expected time 
is necessary for each of us as the incentive to number our days and make them 
count' (quoted in Post, 2004b: 536). Bill McKibben writes: 
Maybe with these tools [such as germline genetic engineering] we 
will in some way learn to live forever, but the joy of it, the meaning of 
it, will melt away like ice cream on an August afternoon ... [L]ife far 
beyond the parameters of what we know now, life that goes beyond 
the normal human expectations, may be very much like a trap, and 
the name of that trap is a very American one - the constant idea that 
more is better. If it is good to live 80 years, it must be better to live 
180 years and far better yet to live 300 years. (Stock et aI, 2003: 7) 
Yet much can be said in response to these objections to substantial life extension. 
What does 'making our days count' mean exactly? Horrobin (2005: 14) notes that 
it seems odd to assert that people enjoy playing football today and experience 
no ennui in doing so only because they are aware that they cannot do it three 
centuries hence. Moreover, what are 'normal human expectations'? The normal 
expectations ofyoungWestern European female office workers in 2007 are very 
different from those of their counterparts in 1875. And is it natural or unnatural 
for human beings to think that more is better? 
Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of the natural law position is expressed 
by Christine Overall (2004; see also 2003). She states that we should not argue 
against increasing human longevity by reference to the limited parameters set by 
current life expectancies. According to her, thi commits the fallacy of begging 
the question.When contexts change and life expectancies become much longer, 
our judgement oflife's possibilities and meanings will also change. Not only will 
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childhood and age be redefined, but concepts like schooling, education, marriage, 
partnership, friendship, sexuality, gender, father, mother, parent, grandparent, 
family, work, job, career, retirement, nationality and citizenship will also acquire 
other meanings. Together these changes will constitute new moral systems. 
But I think Overall exaggerates. The way we think about human fulfilment 
now must be relevant to forming well-considered present-day judgements on 
prolongation oflife. I would agree with her only if she argued that we ought not 
to evaluate substantial life extension exclusively by reference to the kind of life 
that we know now. Certainly, a comprehensive ethical judgement about future 
possibilities requires not just norms, values, facts and extrapolations but also moral 
imagination. 
A concern with meaning is not the prerogative of natural-law critics of 
substantial life extension. Paul vanTongeren does not accept Callahan's arguments 
in favour ofaccepting a natural life cycle and a natural lifespan, but he emphasises 
the importance of knowing what the meaning of life is. 'If we ask to what extent 
we are allowed to, or even should, extend life, we have to realize that vve can 
hardly answer that question as long as we do not know what life is all about' 
(van Tongeren, 1995: 36). Whether we think substantjal life extension morally 
acceptable or desirable very much depends on what we think gives life its meaning. 
Here Walter Gbnnon advances an argument from personal identity: 
Would a significantly long span oftime between earlier and later mental 
states weaken the relations between them and make them so different 
that they effectively belonged to two distinct persons? ... Psychological 
connectedness is necessary for what matters to us. (Glannon, 2001: 
160; for counterarguments see Harris, 2003: 82-5) 
More discussion about meanings of life is needed. But in individualistic secular 
societies people have many different ideas about meanings of life, so it will be 
difficult to reach consensus or even mutual understanding about the value oflife 
extension. Part of the difficulty is that in modern western societies it is widely 
considered that meanings oflife are a private matter, not appropriate subjects of 
public debate. 
The variety in ideas about meanings oflife will be hard to handle in a democracy, 
because differences can be wide and not matters of degree. Transhumanists like 
Max More (2004), Ray Kurzweil and Terry Grossmann (2004), Nick Bostrom 
(2003, 2005),James Hughes (2004), Gregory Stock (2002) and Aubrey de Grey 
(2003,2005) feel that we should not accept biological ageing as inevitable. They 
argue that the fundamental biology of human beings should be changed in 
order to root out senescence and most of death. Other thinkers, not only of the 
natural-law variety, see this as a dangerous illusion, holding that the propagation 
and cultivation of ideas like this are fundamentally detrimental to the meanings 
of human lives. This difference in world view is an extremely important aspect 
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of the debate on substantial extension ofhuman life expectancyWhat is involved 
is expressed very clearly in the words of Michael Lerner: 
[We] need to do the spiritual work as we grow older to accept the 
inevitability of death rather than acting as though aging and death 
could be avoided if only we had a better technology. The enormous 
emotional, spiritual, and financial cost of trying to hang on to life as 
long as possible (and to look as though we were not aging) is fostered 
by a marketplace that tries to sell us endless youth. It is also fostered 
by our cultural failure to honor our elders, provide them with real 
opportunities to share their wisdom, and combat the pervasive ageism 
with its willingness to discard people long before their creative juices 
have dried up, to stigmatize the se2l.Llality of the elderly ... and to 
provide little in the way ofadequately funded and beautifully conceived 
long-term care facilities. (Lerner, 2006: 308-9; see also Baars, 2006) 
The necessity of a humanistic gerontology and an important 
problem 
The preceding pages on substantial life extension st'lrted from the presupposition 
that biogerontology offers many unprecedented promises, but I hope that they 
also made clear that an exclusively biological gerontology would create problems 
while it tried to solve others. A technological fix for existential problems will 
not work and might make matters worse. Like all other fields of crucial human 
concern, ageing must be studied in an interdisciplinary mood and mode. 'Ageing' 
can be studied from different perspectives and acquires different meanings in the 
process: (1) ageing in the sense of (increasing numbers ofpersons with) increasing 
chronological age with all its legal and social implications, (2) ageing in the sense 
ofbiological decline and senescence, which need not keep pace with chronological 
age, and (3) ageing in the sense of continuously interpreting the meanings of 
unique and vulnerable human lives as they unfold and are experienced in time 
(Baars, 2006). These different concepts of ageing are often intermingled and 
mjxed up, with chaotic and sometimes dehumanising results. A study of ageing 
that is culturally dominated by the second concept ofageing and by the science of 
biological senescence might turn out to be cruel. Biogerontologal research needs 
to be embedded in a democratic dialogue on meanings, goals and values. 
In such a dialogue all citizens should be involved. It should not be fostered by 
the natural sciences alone, but also by the social sciences and humanities. None 
of these can be practised without recourse to explicit or implied normative 
assumptions and human values. Most biogerontologists I know personally would 
immediately assent to this: they are humanistic scientists (and often know more of 
philosophy and sociology than humanities scholars know of the natural sciences), 
but the cultural status and promjnence of much-publicised biogerontological 
progress often has an unintended and undesirable cultural impact: 
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There is an irredeemable cultural logic - if death is a solvable problem, 
then old age will be a failure ... Locating the meaning of death in 
biochemical processes and striving for ever-longer lifespans denies the 
possibility of old age as a valued final part of the life course. (Vincent, 
2006: 694) 
Research on meanings of life, the value of old age and a just and humane society 
requires approaches and methods fitting the subject of investigation, and in this 
area research confining itself to a 'hard' laboratory approach is often inappropriate. 
An interdisciplinary humanistic gerontology, however, is a challenging task, with 
risks and dangers on all sides. 
One important problem can be illustrated by a passage from Clifford Geertz 
on the religious perspective on suffering: 
... the problem ofsuffering is paradoxically, not how to avoid suffering 
bu t how to suffer, how to make ofphysical pain, personal loss, worldly 
defeat, or the helpless contemplation of others' agony something 
bearable, supportable - something, as we say, sufferable. (Geertz, quoted 
in Cole, 2002: 37) 
Suffering is and will be a part ofhuman existence. But human suffering always has 
a social, cultural and historical context, which can change. These changes matter 
very much and transform the character of the moral and existential issues we have 
to deal with. For example: my mother's parents, Roman Catholics living in the 
Netherlands, had five young children in 1918-19. Between December 1918 and 
January 1920 four of them died of whooping cough, a contagious disease now 
preventable by vaccination. The little card commemorating these infants' short 
lives starts with the exhortation 'Parents, do not weep!' and ends with the bnes 
'Repeat now and for ever: what God does, is done well'. Indeed, one important 
aspect of religious and non-religious world views is that they offer ways to accept, 
endure and embrace human life as it is. But a dangerous trap for religious as well 
as non-religious meaning frames and related ethics is that they may become too 
conservative, trying to fixate and immobilise cultures and societies.The dynamics 
of biotechnology poses many challenges here. The task for humanists is to find 
a wise balance between accepting humanity as it is and ailTling for an enhanced 
humanity that could be. Humanity never just is; inevitably it must be interpreted 
in a changing context. 
Notes 
1 Women have a higher risk for Alzheimer's than men, age for age, and women 
reach higher ages: by age 85 women outnumber men two to one, although 
starting out life in approximately equal numbers. Moreover,Alzhein'ler's does not 
just affect women in greater numbers because they are more likely to get it.They 
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are also more likely to end up taking care of someone who has it, like a spouse, 
a parent, or a sibling (Legato, 2005: 212-13). 
2 Bernice Neugarten has in 1978 already pointed out that the evidence is scanty 
that 'it will be possible to stretch out the active part oflife without increasing the 
period of physical disability' (Neugarten, 1996: 343). 
3The seven categories ofdamage are: (1) cell death without matching replacement 
(especially important in the heart and the brain), (2) unwanted cells, eg visceral fat 
and senescent cells (important in arthrosis and diabetes), (3) nuclear (epi) mutations 
causing cancer, (4) mitochondrial mutations, (5) extracellular protein/protein 
cross-links (eg leading to high blood pressure), (6) extracellular aggregates 
(eg resulting in amyloid involved in Alzheimer's disease), and (7) intracellular 
aggregates (eg resulting in hardening of the arteries). 
4 I should note that it has not become clear to me what exactly is counted as 
'health-care resources'. 
5 See also www1.umn.edu/humanrtslindex.html 
6 www.un.org/m-illenniumgoals/# 
7 Autonomy, beneficence and justice are also very relevant for the experience 
of a meaningful life (see Baumeister, 1991). In this section on meaning of life I 
specifically refer to human needs for purpose, fulfilment and feeling one with or 
part of a valuable whole. 
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